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The role of domestic factors in the foreign policy of competitive authoritarian regimes: the case of Putin's Russia
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Abstract
3
Introduction
4
1.
Russian foreign policy decision-making in Putin’s Russia
9
2.
Russo-Georgian conflict and its implications
17
3.
The annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine
33
3.1. The annexation of Crimea: geopolitics or diversionary war? Causes
and nature of the conflict
33
3.2. War in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas): the root of the conflict and its
nature
44
Conclusion
54
References
58
Appendix
61
Introduction
Recent scholarship about Moscow’s foreign policy has obsessively focused on external factors that shape it. It may seem that Russia’s behavior on the international stage is always influenced by Western developments or actions. From this point, it would be important to discuss the three levels of analysis in international relations and remember the work of Kenneth Waltz “Man, the State and War” written in 1959. Since that time scholars have been researching the reasons for war more actively not only on the international or systemic levels but also on the state level. It may be reasonable as there is an array of internal factors (regime type, geography, population) that influence the decisions which can result in wars, conflicts or coalition-building. The hypothesis of this work is the following: in the times of economic stability Russia pursues mostly geopolitical goals while during periods of internal problems it focuses more on diversion of its citizens’ attention.
...
1. Russian foreign policy decision-making in Putin’s Russia
The purpose of this chapter is to show to what extent the Russian foreign policy decision-making process is distinctive compared to the West. Also, it might provide peculiar insides for further discussion of assertive invasions conducted by Russia. For a profound analysis of the foreign policy formulation pursued by Russia, it would be convenient to divide it into 4 distinct stages. Although only Vladimir Putin is mentioned in the title of the chapter, it is worth mentioning that Dmitry Medvedev has been the president of the Russian Federation for 4 years (2008-2012).
Many specialists on Russian foreign policy, for example, Tsygankov (2015) claim that even though Medvedev conducted more liberal rhetoric, the substance of both foreign and domestic policies remained unchanged. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper, it is crucial to outline factors that influence the foreign policy decision-making process in this chapter.
...
2. Russo-Georgian conflict and its implications
The first of two conflicts of Russia with its post-Soviet neighbors to which I would like to draw the reader’s attention is the Russo-Georgian War. In conformity with a number of international relations scholars such as Okara (2007), Hassner (2008), and Blank (2009), the Russian invasion of Georgia reasserted its status of the dominant regional power. For the first time in Post-Soviet Russia’s history, a violent response to neighboring states’ pro-western attitudes was made. Vladimir Putin has never disguised that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”. Consequently, this statement made in 2005 was a clear sign of Kremlin’s desire to hold a significant degree of influence on its Post-Soviet sphere of influence.
...
3.1. The annexation of Crimea: geopolitics or diversionary war? Causes and nature of the conflict
It is widely believed that both the Russo-Georgian War and the Crimean Annexation are vivid manifestations of a diversionary foreign policy. And even the Wikipedia article of the same name cites the journal Security Studies (2017) which found that Russian seizure of Crimea in early 2014 "increased national pride among Russians while support for President Vladimir Putin rose dramatically, and they suggest that the two processes were causally linked."
But Putin’s rating growth is a consequence of the appropriation of Crimea and not a prerequisite. And to unambiguously classify the annexation of Crimea as the diversionary war on the basis of this fact alone is completely unscientific. Indeed, this exact result, the rally around the flag effect wants to be achieved by any government, following the path of diversionary war.
...
Conclusion
Everything stated in this part of the chapter confirms that there is a hybrid war in the east of Ukraine. The origins of this war are geopolitical, but its continuation, in my opinion, is primarily an attempt by the state to distract its citizens from domestic political difficulties and extend the Rally round the Flag effect of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. It remains only to figure out what is the difference between the appropriation of the Crimea and the war in the Donbas. Why are the DPR and LPR not accepted as part of Russia?
From my perspective, first of all, this is due to the national composition of these regions. Russians in Crimea make up the ethnic majority (see appendix figure 16). That
53
is, by joining the Crimea, Russia received a strategically important and fairly homogeneous ethnic region without war smoldering there. While the military situation in the Donbas can not be called stable (see appendix figure 20).
...
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Barabanov, M. (2009). The August War Between Russia And Georgia. Moscow Defense Brief, 1, 15.
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Direct Line with Vladimir Putin.
...
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